



Enacted and Rejected Amendments
to the Antidumping Law: In
Implementation or Contravention
of the Antidumping Agreement?
Probably no group of substantive provisions of the Uruguay Round implement-
ing legislation were more controversial and hypertechnical than the amendments
to the U.S. antidumping law. Throughout the negotiation of the Round and efforts
to implement its results into U.S. domestic law, a spirited debate ensued between
U.S. producers that had brought antidumping petitions in the past and other U.S.
producers who felt they had been harmed by such proceedings.
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the names of the
authors.
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At the urging of major petitioning industries, key members of Congress repeat-
edly urged the administration to preserve aggressive enforcement of U.S. trade
laws, including the antidumping law, to protect U.S. producers and workers.
On the other side, major U.S. companies interested in exporting and importing
opposed provisions they felt might jeopardize their international competitiveness
by either the application of similar foreign practices against U.S. exports or
restricted access to global sourcing.
In light of the controversy over these provisions, this article illustrates the
debate between their champions and opponents. With respect to the most im-
portant and contentious antidumping amendments proposed or enacted, Alan
Holmer first describes them. Gary Horlick and Terry Stewart then debate their
merits and consistency (or lack thereof) with the Uruguay Round Antidumping
Agreement.
Some of the provisions debated are likely, at some point in the future, to be
subject to challenge in the U.S. courts and under the new World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) dispute-settlement provisions. The Horlick-Stewart debate thus may
foreshadow future U.S. and WTO litigation.
I. Provisions Enacted into Law
A. START-UP COSTS
Mr. Holmer:
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement provides that sales-below-cost
calculations will be adjusted for circumstances in which costs are affected by
start-up operations.' The premise of this provision is that costs incurred at the
initial stages of an industry's production can artificially create the appearance
of below-cost pricing. An adjustment for such costs could be significant in cases
involving high-technology products, which typically have high start-up costs and
a short life cycle.
Section 224 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act adds a new provision to
the Tariff Act of 19302 and authorizes an adjustment for start-up costs, subject
to certain limitations. The debate between petitioner and respondent camps and
within the administration, the House of Representatives, and the Senate focused
principally on when an adjustment for start-up could be made, the duration of
the start-up period, and the methodology for making start-up adjustments. For
example, the administration's proposal and the Senate Finance Committee's draft
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
April 15, 1994, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, art. 2.2.1.1 [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
2. See Tariff Act of 1930, § 773(f)(1)(C), 19 U.S.C. § 1671 [hereinafter the Act], amended
by H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 224 (1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreements Act].
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bill3 disallowed any adjustment for start-up costs with respect to products requiring
retooling for routine model-year changes. On the other hand, the House Ways
and Means Committee's draft bill allowed an adjustment for both fixed and
variable start-up costs, as well as in instances where a factory is revamped to
produce a new product, or an existing product is substantially redesigned.
Mr. Horlick:
Footnote 6 to article 2.2.1.1 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that, for
start-up operations, an adjustment to cost shall be made to "reflect the costs at
the end of the start-up period or, if that period extends beyond the period of
investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account
by the authorities during the investigation." 4 This exception to the normal "rea-
sonable period of time" rule for cost recovery was a compromise between those
favoring a provision reflecting business reality, where companies often live by
projections of product lives, and the U.S. negotiators' reluctance to rely com-
pletely on company projections. The formula used in footnote 6 of the Agreement
(i.e., the unit costs at the end of the start-up period or the investigation period)
resulted from a series of discussions between U.S. computer companies worried
about their exposure overseas, particularly during refund procedures, and the
senior U.S. negotiator.
The Agreement does not limit the costs to be included in the start-up adjustment.
Article 2.2.1.1 of the Agreement refers explicitly to "the costs associated with
the production and sale of the product under consideration." 5 In the implementing
legislation, the administration tried, unsuccessfully, to limit the costs included
in the adjustment to fixed costs only.' The administration was successful, how-
ever, in limiting the costs eligible for adjustment to production costs.7 Thus, for
those operations that incur large marketing expenditures during the start-up phase,
3. Under the fast-track procedures, the administration essentially negotiates with the House
and Senate the content of the bill the President ultimately submits to implement a trade agreement.
Thus, the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees (in addition to other relevant
congressional committees of jurisdiction) each produces a draft bill; differences are resolved in an
informal conference. With respect to the Uruguay Round implementing bill, a handful of differences
were left unresolved. The Clinton administration was thus given the flexibility to pick (or modify)
the version it preferred.
4. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.2.1.1 n.6.
5. Emphasis added.
6. See House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Draft Legislative Language
for the administration's Implementing Proposals on the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement
and Corresponding Provisions of the Subsidies Agreement 93 (July 12, 1994) [hereinafter Draft
Legislation].
7. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action 167, in Message
from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts
of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting
Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, Vol. I, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 656, 837 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
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such as consumer products industries, the start-up adjustment will be restricted,
notwithstanding the express words of the Agreement.'
The statute also provides that the start-up period will be considered to end once
the level of commercial production characteristic of the merchandise, industry, or
producer is achieved. 9 The Statement of Administrative Action further indicates
that the Department of Commerce (Commerce) will measure production levels
based on the units processed.'l
Mr. Stewart:
The issue of start-up has generally not been raised in antidumping cases. While
it has had some relevance in consumer electronics and has clear application in
short life-cycle products such as semiconductors, it has been an issue of no
relevance in the vast majority of all cases considered in the United States and
abroad. The reason is fairly obvious. Unless an investigation covers multiple
generations of products, an investigation is not likely to be initiated until a foreign
producer is well past the start-up phase. Prior to that time, any significant importa-
tions are unlikely. However, because of the importance of the issue in certain
short life-cycle products and its potential relevance in future cases in the automo-
tive area, the issue was heavily debated in the United States, particularly by
semiconductor producers and their customers and by automobile companies.
The issue addressed in article 2.2.1.1 n.6 of the Antidumping Agreement on
what, if any, adjustment should be made for start-up was a compromise between
countries who wanted to have the ability to base decisions upon actual data within
the context of ongoing investigations and those who wanted to have the opportunity
to provide estimates of future or life-cycle costs. " The compromise reached
indicated that "the adjustment made for start-up operations shall reflect the costs
at the end of the start-up period or, if that period extends beyond the period of
investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account
by the authorities during the investigation. ' 12 The compromise is specifically
incorporated into the administration's proposal.
3
8. The U.S. auto industry is one of the largest beneficiaries of the lower trade barriers under
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S. auto exports to Mexico have increased
by approximately 241% since the NAFTA's entry into force. Robert J. Caldwell, NAFTA Boosts
Trade, Creates Jobs, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 4, 1994, at G-4. If Mexico were to adopt the
U.S. statutory limitation on the start-up adjustment to production-related costs in its antidumping
law, U.S. automotive exports could be the target of dumping allegations, since huge up-front marketing
and advertising costs can occur when introducing a new car.
9. See the Act, supra note 2, § 1677b(f)(1)(C), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements
Act § 224.
10. See SAA, supra note 7, at 836.
11. For a discussion of start-up cost and the larger issues of sales below cost, see TERENCE
P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1543-53 (1993)
[hereinafter NEGOTIATING HISTORY].
12. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.2.1.1 n.6.
13. See, e.g., the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(C), as amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2.
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The Agreement does not provide a definition of what constitutes the end of a
start-up process, how broadly or narrowly the concept of start-up should be
viewed (for example, annual model changes vs. a new product) or what costs
should be adjusted (variable or fixed or both). Yet the debate over U.S. implement-
ing legislation largely revolved around these GATT-undefined issues. As is true
in the GATT generally, where the agreement does not specify an outcome or
approach, the choice of how an issue will be addressed is left to the individual
governments absent violation of some other provision.
The administration bill and Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) devote
an extraordinary amount of space to the start-up issue. 14 The issues covered
include: (1) definition of start-up; (2) duration of start-up; and (3) adjustment
methodology (incorporating GATT requirements). The statutory and administra-
tive action language strikes a reasonable balance between the competing sides.
As noted in the SAA:
In calculating cost of production and constructed value, it is appropriate to take into
account that a firm may experience unusually high costs when it is "starting up" a
new product or new production facilities. However, any adjustment for such startup
costs must be carefully limited to ensure that such an adjustment is not transformed
into a license to dump. Section 773(f)(1)(C) accomplishes these objectives.15
Stated differently, an overly broad construction of start-up situations will permit
unsustainable pricing practices, that is, prices below cost over time, to be viewed
as "fair pricing," contrary to U.S. law and our international rights under the
Agreement. 16
Concerns of domestic producers who must bring cases against injurious price
discrimination focused on several issues: (1) the burden of establishing entitlement
to an adjustment should be on the company possessing the information (the respon-
dent) as is true elsewhere in the law; (2) costs that are incurred during start-up
that are unusual should not be permitted to escape scrutiny entirely, but should
be amortized over a reasonable period; (3) situations in which start-up can be
claimed should be limited to those where there is likely to be a significant cost
difference, for example, new plant or major retooling of existing facilities; (4)
start-up should be viewed as ending as soon as a company is in commercial
production; and (5) the adjustment should be limited to differences in variable
costs. Because the Antidumping Agreement requires that costs at the end of
the start-up period be used (not an average of the costs during the period of
investigation), the objectives of petitioners were fashioned to limit the adjustment
to bona fide start-up situations and not permit other adjustments, such as the
business cycle, to be piled-on.
Many of the domestic producer objectives (1, 2, and 3) are contained in the
14. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 2, at 199-201; SAA, supra note 7, at 835-38.
15. SAA, supra note 7, at 835.
16. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.2.2.
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statute or SAA. However, several issues remain troubling. Their resolution over
time will determine whether start-up adjustments are properly limited or become
"a license to dump." Most importantly, the determination of when start-up ends
will be critical in many cases. Start-up is defined as ending "at the point at which
the level of commercial production that is characteristic of the merchandise,
producer, or industry concerned is achieved."' 7 The SAA indicates that the deci-
sion will be made on a case-by-case basis and contains a number of qualifiers




As amended, the Tariff Act includes a new "captive production" provision
relating to the manner in which the International Trade Commission (ITC) deter-
mines whether a U.S. industry is injured, or threatened with injury, by reason
of less-than-fair-value imports. 8 The new provision applies where a portion of the
industry's production is not sold on the merchant market, but rather is consumed
internally to produce a downstream product.
The ITC's recent practice has been not to distinguish between captive and
merchant sales in identifying the U.S. industry; all U.S. output of subject mer-
chandise was treated as belonging to the U.S. industry, regardless of whether
certain sales were destined for captive production. 9
Representatives of the U.S. steel industry argued that under ITC practice,
upstream steel products were "double counted"; for example, they claimed that
hot-rolled steel transformed into cold-rolled steel was taken into account twice,
because ultimately the only steel produced for consumption was the cold-rolled
steel.
Section 222(b)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act provides that in
circumstances in which the captive production provision applies,2 ° the ITC will
primarily focus on the merchant market for the domestic like product in analyzing
market share and the financial performance of the U.S. industry.
Mr. Stewart:
Many producers are vertically integrated through a variety of stages of manufac-
ture generally for manufacturing and cost efficiency reasons. Vertically integrated
17. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(C)(iii).
18. Id. § 1677(7)(C), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 222(b)(2).
19. Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-
319-332, 334, 336-342, 344, and 347-353 (Final) and 731-TA-573-579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609,
and 612-619 (Final), USITC Pub. 2664 (Aug. 1993), Vol. I, at 15-18 n.50.
20. See Saarstahl A.G. v. U.S., No. 94-92, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 7, 1994) (Mr. Horlick's
comments on the circumstances in which the captive production provision is to be applied).
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producers can manufacture products in various levels of integrated, automated
facilities. Depending on the production process, by-products or co-products may
result from a single production run. Producers may or may not be able to influence
the amount of by-products or co-products produced. It is not uncommon for some
companies to produce a product for the sole purpose of being sold to unrelated
users, while other companies may produce a product solely or principally as an
input into a later product. Imports of the product will directly impact the former
producers and may or may not indirectly impact the second group. The ITC is
frequently confronted with questions of whether integrated operations are, in
fact, producers of multiple products even though the facilities may be integrated
and production of an "earlier" product is done solely or primarily for production
of a later product. These earlier-stage products are often called "captive produc-
tion" when they are consumed by the producer for purposes of making a further
processed item. ITC practice and treatment of captive production, as well as
inconsistent ITC practice over time, are well summarized in its 1993 final determi-
nation in the flat-rolled steel cases.21 Specifically, the ITC has recognized that
imports may not affect merchant market production and captive market production
in the same way and has given separate consideration to the effect of imports on
the merchant market segment of the industry as part of its analysis in determining
whether the imports are materially injuring the total domestic industry, including
captive production. It is also true that the ITC has in prior cases also examined
only merchant sales in rendering its final determination.22
The treatment of captive production was not an issue considered in Geneva
during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Article 3 (injury) and article 4 (domestic
industry) remain unchanged in areas arguably relevant to any consideration of
captive production.
Section 222 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act provides modifications
to the definitions contained in section 771 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Specifically,
a new section 771(7)(C)(iv) is added to provide specific statutory guidance on
how the ITC is to handle situations where a product is both sold in significant
quantities into the merchant market and further processed internally to produce
a different product. A review of the statute and the SAA make clear that (1) the
ITC's traditional "like product" analysis is not modified,23 (2) the ITC will
continue to examine, inter alia, total industry production and profit performance,
and (3) the ITC's current practice of examining the impact of imports on merchant
and captive portions of the market will be modified to make the focus on the
21. Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-
319-332, 334, 336-342, 344, and 347-353 (Final) and 731-TA-573-579, 581-592,594-597, 599-609,
and 612-619 (Final), USITC Pub. 2664, supra note 19, at 17-18.
22. Id.
23. See SAA, supra note 7, at 183.
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merchant market more important in the overall analysis: "[t]he Commission will
focus primarily on the merchant market in analyzing the market share and financial
performance of the domestic industry."
2 4
The statutory provision as drafted is both narrowly drawn as to its reach and
constitutes at most a modification in degree of past ITC practice. Because of the
broad discretion given to the ITC in evaluating the impact of imports on domestic
industries, the additional guidance to place primary focus on the area of direct
competition is both logical and consistent with the existing U.S. statutory structure
and our international obligations.
Mr. Horlick:
There is no basis in the Antidumping Agreement for singling out captive produc-
tion for special treatment for purposes of material injury analysis. The Agreement
requires that the effects of the dumped imports be assessed in relation to the
domestic production of the like product. 5 In addition, with two limited exceptions,
neither of which relates to captive production, the Agreement defines the domestic
industry to be the domestic producers "as a whole" of the like product.26 Thus,
injury analysis that is premised upon the exclusion of captive production is likely
to be challenged as inconsistent with the Agreement.
Still writhing from defeat in the 1993 hot-rolled steel cases,27 the U.S. integrated
steel mills actively lobbied for the inclusion of the captive production provision
in the implementing legislation. The administration refused to include a captive
production provision in its proposed legislation and, in fact, initially opposed
the provision in official statements.2" The administration eventually caved to
24. See id. at 182.
25. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 7, art. 3.6.
26. See id. art. 4.1.
27. In its final injury determination, the ITC stated that
in making our determination of whether a domestic industry is materially injured by
reason of subsidized or LTFV imports, the Commission is required to evaluate the
condition of the domestic producers as a whole of the like product or those producers
whose collective output of the like product constitutes a major proportion of the total
domestic production of that product. The impact of the subsidized or dumped imports
must be evaluated in relation to U.S. production of a like product. Thus, the statute
defines the domestic industry in terms of production, not in terms of markets, distribu-
tion channels, or similar factors. Petitioners' proposal to exclude internal transfers of
upstream or "semifinished" products from the calculations of apparent consumption,
market share and financial performance relating to such products similarly is not
supported by the statute, Commission practice or judicial precedent where investiga-
tions involve more than one industry.
Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, Invs. No. 701-TA-319-332,
334, 336-342, 344, and 347-353 (Final) and 731-TA-573-579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, and
612-619 (Final), USITC Pub. 2664, supra note 19, at 16-17.
28. See, e.g., Yerxa Sees Sunset, Compensation as Hard Issues in GAIT Bill, 12 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 7 (1994).
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political pressure, however, and the captive production provision made its way
into the implementing legislation.29 The administration justified its abrupt change
in position, in part, on its claim that Canada, in a 1993 case, adopted a practice
of focusing primarily on merchant market production in its injury analysis. 3
The captive production provision in the new bill directs the ITC to focus
primarily-but not exclusively-on the merchant market in analyzing the market
share and financial performance of the domestic industry in narrowly defined
circumstances. Specifically, in addition to finding that the volume of the domestic
like product sold captively and in the merchant market is "significant," the ITC
must also find that: (1) the domestic like product, which is internally transferred
for processing into downstream products, does not enter the merchant market
for the domestic like product; (2) the domestic like product is the predominant
material input in the production of the downstream products; and (3) the produc-
tion of the domestic like product sold in the merchant market is not generally
used in the production of those downstream products. 3' Further, with respect to
the third factor, the ITC will consider the production of the domestic like product
sold in the merchant market generally to be used in the production of the down-
stream products if a significant portion of the production that enters the merchant
market is actually processed into the same downstream product as the product
that is produced from the internally transferred captive production.32 Similarly,
captive imports would be excluded from the calculations as well.
C. PRICE AVERAGING
Mr. Holmer:
The Antidumping Agreement generally requires the calculation of dumping
margins on an average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction basis.33 This re-
quirement represents a change from prior U.S. practice, under which margins
29. "Captive production" was part of an en bloc package that the administration negotiated
with House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Gibbons. In addition to captive production, the
integrated steel mills also got a provision in the subsidies legislation that reversed the 1994 Court
of International Trade decision, Saarstahl v. United States, which overturned a highly political decision
by Commerce in 1993 that subsidies automatically continued after an arm's-length privatization. See
Saarstahl A.G. v. United States, No. 94-92, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 7, 1994). In exchange,
U.S. exporters obtained provisions in the en bloc package whereby more than one year would be
permitted for cost recovery, and an explicit fair comparison rule would be adopted.
30. See Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Originating in or Exported from the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (CITT Inquiry
No. NQ-92-009, Aug. 13, 1993, at 19).
31. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(7)(C)(iv), as amended by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 222(b)(2).
32. See SAA, supra note 7, at 183.
33. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.4.2.
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were calculated by comparing individual U.S. sales to average home (or third-
country) market sales. 4
As implemented, the new price averaging requirement provides that Commerce
will normally determine dumping margins on the basis of a weighted-average
of "normal" (formerly home-market or third-country) values with a weighted-
average of "export" (formerly U.S.) prices. However, this provision will nor-
mally apply only in original investigations, not in subsequent annual administra-
tive reviews (when antidumping duties are assessed rather than merely estimated).
New section 777A(d)(2) provides that when a comparison is made between indi-
vidual export prices and weighted average foreign prices in annual reviews,
Commerce will limit its averaging of prices to the period not exceeding the
calendar month corresponding most closely to the month of the individual export
sale.
Mr. Horlick:
Throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States and the Euro-
pean Community were intransigent on the issue of fair comparisons. Hiding
behind a purported fear of targeted dumping, they did not want to give up their
longstanding practice of comparing individual sales in the import market to
weighted average prices in the foreign market, the effect of which was to create
or increase margins. 35 However, once a limited exception to the average-to-
average or individual-to-individual comparison was included in the Agreement
to address the concern about targeted dumping, the United States and the European
Community no longer had a credible basis to object to the provision.
During the early stages of discussions on the implementing legislation, the
administration took the position that it was agreed during the negotiations to
compare weighted-average prices in each market only in investigations and not
in administrative reviews. To justify this position, the United States relied on
the Agreement's explicit reference to the "investigation phase." 36 Others have
a different recollection of the negotiations, noting that the discussions did not
focus on the administrative review phase, because the U.S. negotiators reportedly
claimed that the then-current U.S. practice was to compare individual-to-
individual sales in reviews. Moreover, nothing in article 2.4.2 of the Agreement
34. See, e.g., Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in
Part of an Antidumping Duty Order, Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings)
and Parts Thereof from France et al., 58 Fed. Reg. 39,729, 39,779 (1993).
35. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, How THE GATT
AFFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY POLICY 33-35 (1994) [hereinafter CBO
Study].
36. There is an internal inconsistency in the administration's interpretation of the use of the term
"investigation" in the Agreement. For example, the implementing legislation provides for cumulation
in sunset reviews, as well as in investigations, even though article 3.3 of the Agreement permits
cumulation in investigations. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1675, as amended by Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 221.
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overrides the express requirement in article 2.4 of a fair comparison, which even
the administration concedes applies to administrative reviews.
In drafting the implementing legislation on price comparison methodology,
the administration ignored the fair comparison requirement of article 2.4 of the
Agreement and adopted for administrative reviews the current U.S. practice of
comparing individual U.S. sales to a monthly weighted-average of sales in the
foreign market.37 The administration also ignored article 18.3 of the Agreement,
which applies the agreed rules equally to both investigations and reviews of
existing measures. 38 It is quite likely that the United States will be challenged
in the WTO on the comparison methodology applied in reviews. This potentiality
for challenge follows not only from the express wording of articles 2.4 and 18.3,
but also from the practical consequences. That is, if the United States applies
different price comparison methodologies in investigations and reviews, it will
cause great uncertainty and unpredictability. Further, it will impede the ability
of foreign producers and exporters subject to dumping orders to set prices in the
United States at a level sufficient to be found selling at nondumped prices.
The legislation retains the explicit authority, granted by Congress in 1984,
for Commerce to use average-to-average price comparisons in investigations and
reviews.39 Under past administrations, Commerce has almost always refused to
use this authority, however, because it would usually result in more representative
dumping margins.
Mr. Stewart:
Price averaging was a contentious issue in the negotiations in Geneva. How-
ever, unlike many other issues in the Antidumping Agreement, the limitation of
price averaging to the investigation phase was accepted by parties to the negotia-
tions by the fall of 1990 and was never seriously contested after the position
was accepted. 40 Indeed, the debate in Geneva revolved mainly around what the
investigation standard would be, whether there would be both transaction-to-
transaction and average-to-average options, and whether targeting practices
would permit an exception.
None of the countries with active dumping laws were willing to consider averag-
37. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(2), as amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 229.
38. The administration claims that article 18.3 does not require the application of the same rules
in investigations and reviews. See SAA, supra note 7, at 819. Again, others' recollections differ
with respect to the intent of article 18.3. A WTO panel will be guided by the plain meaning of the
words of article 18.3.
39. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1, as amended by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 229.
40. See, e.g., "New Zealand I" version of Draft Antidumping Agreement (Nov. 6, 1990) art.
2.4.2, and similar provisions in New Zealand II (Nov. 15, 1990), New Zealand III (Nov. 23, 1990),
Ramsauer I (Nov. 26, 1991), Dunkel Draft (Dec. 20, 1991), and Antidumping Agreement, supra
note 1, art 2.4.2. See generally NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 11, at 1537-43.
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ing after the investigation phase. Many countries impose duties on individual
entries as entered, making averaging unrealistic. Moreover, there are policy
reasons for not extending any averaging to the assessment phase, perhaps the
most important of which is preventing the windfall to those buying dumped
merchandise having some part of the dumping duties that should be paid charged
to those importers paying fair value. Those who sought an expansion of the
Geneva agreement in U.S. implementing legislation were fighting a battle they
had already lost in Geneva.
Section 229(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act incorporates the anti-
dumping agreement terms into proposed section 777A(d) of the Tariff Act of
1930. Section 777A(d)(1) reflects the terms of the antidumping agreement for
investigations. Section 777A(d)(2) codifies existing agency practice in most cases
with the compromise reached during the congressional review of limiting averag-
ing of home market sales in reviews to a one-month period.
The proposed changes to U.S. law not only reflect our international obligations
and rights, but also will minimize the possibility of unfair results to importers
who pay fair value. It avoids allowing to go unanswered the problems of masking
of dumping margins or targeting.
D. EXPORT PRICE: ADJUSTMENT FOR PROFIT
Mr. Holmer:
The Antidumping Agreement requires a fair comparison between the export
price and the normal value.' Under prior law, Commerce was directed to make
a deduction from U.S. price for profit arising from further manufacturing in
the United States. 4' However, the amended Tariff Act includes a controversial
provision that directs Commerce to deduct from the constructed export price
profit arising not only from further manufacturing, but also from selling and
distribution activities performed by an affiliated party in the United States. 43 The
provision is particularly controversial in that there is no equivalent deduction
for profit from normal value.
The SAA describes the methodology to be followed by Commerce in calculating
a deduction for United States profit." The profit is calculated by multiplying
total profit on the subject merchandise sold in the United States and the foreign
like product sold in the home market by the ratio of total U.S. manufacturing
costs and selling expenses to total manufacturing costs and selling expenses. The
formula is as follows:
41. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.4.
42. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a.
43. See id., 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(3).
44. SAA, supra note 7, at 824-26.
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U.S. profit = Total profit X U.S. expenses
Total expenses
where U.S. expenses = U.S. cost of manufacture
+ U.S. selling expenses
total expenses = home market cost of manufacture
+ home market selling expenses
" U.S. cost of manufacture
+ U.S. selling expenses
and total profit = profit on subject merchandise
sold in the United States
+ profit on foreign like product
sold in the home market
The SAA directs Commerce to rely on costs specific to the subject merchandise
provided that Commerce is simultaneously conducting a cost investigation or the
respondent is willing to submit the necessary information voluntarily. Otherwise,
Commerce may rely on costs for the narrowest category of merchandise sold in
the United States and the exporting country that includes the subject merchandise,
or, alternatively, the narrowest category of merchandise sold in all countries that
includes the subject merchandise.
Mr. Stewart:
No other issue has been more grossly mischaracterized by importers and foreign
producers than the issue of a deduction of profit from a related party importer's
resale price in the United States. While the proposed amendment to U.S. law
may be viewed as controversial, the controversy is not plausibly about GATT
consistency or whether "mirror legislation" might be enacted by our trading
partners. For nearly thirty years, U.S. administration of the antidumping law
has singularly prejudiced U.S. manufacturers by refusing to deduct what three
GATT Antidumping Agreements have specifically authorized45 and what our
major trading partners have routinely done to U.S. exports.46
45. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, June 30, 1967, art. 2(f), 19 U.S.T. 4348, 4350 [hereinafter 1967 Anti-Dumping Code]
("allowance for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for
profits accruing, should also be made"); Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, November 28, 1979, art. 2.6, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 4926
[hereinafter 1979 Anti-Dumping Code] ("allowance for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred
between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made"); Antidumping
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.4 ("allowances for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between
importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made").
46. See Terence P. Stewart, Administration of the Antidumping Law: A Different Perspective,
in DOWN IN THE DUMPs 314-15 n.45 (1991) (citing EEC regulations from 1968 and 1985; Canadian
law from 1968; Australian laws of 1975 and 1981).
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Prior administrations have acknowledged that the deduction of profit on resale
is both GATT-consistent and administrable. Moreover, counsel representing
foreign producers and exporters have acknowledged that existing U.S. law can
create an advantage for foreign producers if they can structure their transactions
through related party importers exactly because existing U.S. law-unlike the
GATT and the law of our trading partners-does not deduct the importer's profit
on resale.48
Neither the GATT nor the deduction of a reasonable profit on resale makes
it harder for foreign producers who sell through related party importers to defend
themselves. The GATT calls for a constructed export price in those situations
because the transfer price (that is, the price to the importer) is unreliable.49 One
deducts expenses and a reasonable profit on resale (European Union practice is
to deduct the profit margin normally obtained on the same general class of products
by unrelated importers) to construct an export price to the importer.50 As respon-
dents' counsel acknowledge, failure to deduct profit on resale increases U.S.
prices and reduces dumping margins simply because of the relationship of the
importer-a bias no other country with an active law permits.
While there are problems with the implementing legislation, the problems flow
from the United States' not going far enough in the construction of an export
price-deducting some portion of "actual profit" on the combined transactions
instead of a reasonable profit on resale, with the effect that foreign producers
who sell below cost in the United States will be rewarded by having no profit
deducted even though no importer could stay in business losing money on every
transaction.
While other concerns exist about how the level of trade adjustment will be
applied (particularly whether adjustments will be made where no demonstration
of price effect has been made), the language of the level of trade provision and
SAA remains ambiguous enough to say that whether problems will exist will
largely be determined by case law.
47. See CONG. REC. S8982 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (in reference
to amendment that would deduct profits on resale, "the administration agrees that it is GATT consistent
and administrable").
48. See, e.g., N. Hemmendinger & W.H. Barringer, The Defense of Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Investigations under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 427, 433-34 (1981) ("The exporter's sales price often is a more favorable basis of calculating
fair value because, unlike purchase price, the profit of the U.S. importer is included in the net
adjusted price, resulting in a higher United States price."); Memorandum from Wender Murase &
White, attorneys for Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. 12 (July 26, 1984) ("It has been our experience
as trade lawyers that exporter's sales price frequently [but not always] operates to the advantage of
foreign respondents. In the case of SMI steel sold to the U.S. through a trading company, there is
no question but that the use of exporter's sales price would benefit the respondent, for the trading
company's selling price includes a profit which would elevate the U.S. price by an equal amount.").
49. 1977 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 45, art. 2.5.
50. See id. art. 2.6.
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Mr. Horlick:
The 1967 and 1979 Anti-Dumping Codes stated that a fair comparison should
be effected between the export price and the normal value. 5' Nevertheless, many
countries used price comparison methodologies that skewed the margin results
in favor of their domestic industries. Thus, one of the major negotiating objectives
of many countries during the Uruguay Round antidumping negotiations was to
include an explicit requirement that there be a fair comparison between the export
price and the normal value in determining whether dumping is occurring.5 2 Indeed,
one of the major accomplishments of the negotiations is the preeminence of the
explicit fair comparison requirement in article 2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement.
During the negotiations, the European Community, backed by the United
States, was vehemently opposed to accepting any change in the language from
the earlier Anti-Dumping Codes, regarding the manner in which dumping margins
are calculated. The E.C. negotiators insisted on maintaining the language from
the two earlier Codes, which provided that, for export sales through related
parties, "allowance for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between impor-
tation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made." 53 The language
of article 2.4 of the new Antidumping Agreement was carefully drafted to override
that phrase, inter alia, by framing the fair comparison requirement as "shall,"
thus making it mandatory.
The U.S. implementing legislation includes the overriding fair comparison
requirement of the Agreement. 54 However, during the final minutes of the negotia-
tions between the administration and congressional committee staff to finalize
the bill,55 a provision was added to require that a calculated profit be deducted
from certain related party transactions in the U.S. market only."
In exchange for the profit deduction, the administration agreed to consider
making an offsetting level of trade adjustment to the normal value in certain
cases. However, the legislation mandates a cap on indirect expenses, which limits
the amount of indirect expenses that may be deducted from the normal value to
the amount of indirect expenses deducted from the U.S. price, regardless of the
51. See id; 1967 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 45.
52. See, e.g., Amendments to the Anti-Dumping Code, Communication from the Delegation of
Hong Kong (Mar. 21, 1990), MTN.GNG/NG8/W/5 1/Add. 2 at 3; Amendments to the Anti-Dumping
Code, Submission by the Nordic Countries (Dec. 22, 1989), MTN.GNG/NG8/W/64 at 5. Some of
the specific language actually used can be found in informal (and unnumbered) submissions by
interested parties.
53. See 1967 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 45; 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 45
(emphasis added).
54. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a), as amended by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 224.
55. September 19, 1994, at 12:20 A.M.
56. An administration official stated that the inclusion of the profit deduction provision was
essential to get Senator Hollings to agree not to block the entire bill.
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actual amount of indirect expenses incurred on the home market (or third country)
sales.57
Because these provisions were added at the eleventh hour in a secret meeting,
no consideration and deliberation by members of the House and Senate occurred,
nor did the trade community have an opportunity to comment before the deal
was closed by the administration.
The United States is likely to be challenged in the WTO on the application of
the cap, the deduction of profit only from the U.S. price side of the dumping
equation, and the failure of the statute to ensure that a level of trade adjustment
is made to normal value sufficient to compensate for the deductions from the U. S.
price.58 All of these are potential violations of the fair comparison requirement in
the Agreement. In addition, challenges can also be expected on the artificial
nature of the profit calculation. More fundamentally, the Agreement requires
that price comparisons be made "normally at the ex factory level," reflecting
United States practice since 1921 and the drafting history of the 1967 Anti-
Dumping Code. If the new statute requires comparisons on other than an ex-
factory basis, the United States is likely to be challenged on that ground as well.
E. ANTICIRCUMVENTION/DIVERSIONARY INPUT DUMPING
Mr. Holmer:
Section 1321 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 added
a new provision to the Tariff Act intended to prevent the evasion or circumvention
of antidumping and countervailing duty orders in four separate circumstances.5 9
This provision has been opposed by some respondents in U.S. antidumping pro-
ceedings as allowing an unwarranted expansion of U.S. law; conversely, some
U.S. petitioners argued that the provision had been ineffective in addressing
circumvention of antidumping and countervailing duty orders.
57. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2) (1993). The rationale offered for the cap is the inability of
authorities to detect excessive claims for deductions of indirect expenses; the cap represents an
irrebuttable presumption that all indirect selling expenses claimed for home market sales are false
to the extent they are in excess of indirect selling expenses deducted from the U.S. price.
58. Commerce will be faced with the requirement to ensure that the level of trade adjustment
to the normal value yields a fair comparison with the U.S. price after deductions of direct and indirect
expenses and an allocated portion of profit. The automatic assumption that a comparison of sales
at the same level of trade requires no adjustment is based on the fiction that sales to two different
parties at the same level of trade are identical in all respects. Unless the Commerce Department can
establish, based on positive evidence, that the activities of the two parties at the same level of trade
are, in fact, identical (which is often unlikely for commercial entities in different countries), Commerce
will not be able to assume that such sales are identical. Under article 17.6(i) of the Agreement, the
authorities have an obligation to establish the facts. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1. Thus,
assumptions, such as one where Commerce would assume that sales are identical if sold at the same
level of trade, would not satisfy that obligation.
59. The circumstances are merchandise completed or assembled in the United States or foreign
countries, minor alterations to merchandise, and later developed merchandise. See the Act, supra
note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677j.
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Despite extensive negotiations on this subject in the Uruguay Round, the Uru-
guay Round Final Act did not include anticircumvention provisions. However,
the WTO Agreement contains a Ministerial Decision and Declaration stating the
desirability of obtaining "uniform rules in this area as soon as possible.' 60
Section 230 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act amends sections 781(a)
and 78 1(b) of the Tariff Act and makes it somewhat more likely that affirmative
anticircumvention findings will be made in the future. Under the 1988 Act, in
order for Commerce to include parts and components in the scope of an order,
it must have found that the difference in the value of the finished merchandise
sold in the United States (that is, the original merchandise subject to the order)
was "small." According to the SAA, the Clinton administration believes that
the 1988 Act provision (1) "fails to address adequately circumvention scenarios
in which only minor assembly is done in the United States (or a third country),
but for various reasons the difference in value is not 'small,' " and (2) allows
U.S. imports of third-country parts to make it more difficult to apply the anticir-
cumvention provision. 6' Accordingly, section 230 would require Commerce, in
making an anticircumvention determination, to focus on whether (1) the process
of assembly in the United States (or third country) is minor or insignificant, and
(2) the value of the parts imported into the United States (or third country) is a
significant portion of the total value of the finished product.
Regarding "diversionary input dumping," the SAA includes a Senate-
originated provision (offered by Senator Danforth), which clarifies the so-called
major-input rule. 62 Essentially, the measure provides that if an investigation or
review is initiated of a downstream product (for example, cold-rolled steel) which
incorporates an upstream product as a major input (for example, hot-rolled steel),
Commerce may determine the value of the major input (in this case, hot-rolled
steel) on the basis of the best information available regarding the cost of produc-
tion, if there is an affiliation between the producer of the upstream and downstream
products. The stated purpose of the provision is to account for the effect of
below-cost inputs in the production of exported products.
Mr. Horlick:
The SAA attempts to justify the amended anticircumvention provisions in U.S.
law, stating that "[Tihe Ministerial Decision constitutes a recognition of the
legitimacy of anticircumvention measures and does not preclude members from
maintaining, modifying, or enacting anticircumvention measures at this time.,
63
Article VI of the GATT states that antidumping duties may not be imposed without
a finding of both dumping and injury with respect to the like product from the
60. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, Decision on Anticircumvention.
61. See SAA, supra note 7, at 893.
62. Id. at 894-95.
63. Id. at 819.
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specific country subject to investigation. 64 Moreover, the new Agreement prohib-
its countries from taking action against dumping of exports by a member except
in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.65 Thus, the amended law
is likely to be challenged in the WTO.
With respect to diversionary input dumping, the major input rule in the amended
law also appears likely to be challenged, since the Agreement requires that produc-
tion costs be calculated based on the records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation, rather than on costs imputed by the administering authorities. 66 In
addition, problems could arise if Commerce automatically limits itself to the
greater of cost or market value.67
Mr. Stewart:
No problem has caused greater concern to petitioners than the ability of foreign
producers to circumvent outstanding antidumping and countervailing duty orders.
Every country that has been an active user of article VI rights has found itself
facing the need to determine how to minimize the forms of circumvention that
will remain unactionable. The issue and the solutions formulated by individual
countries have had both GATT and domestic law dimensions.
The United States, the European Union, and other "user" countries had long
believed that countries had the authority to see that remedies provided under article
VI were effective. Japan successfully challenged European anticircumvention
procedures in 1989-90 on the grounds that as applied in the European Union
they violated the national treatment requirements of article II1. 6 Efforts by the
United States, the European Union, and other countries to obtain a consensus
on the situations when anticircumvention measures could be taken as part of the
Uruguay Round negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful as the United States
viewed the draft language as too limited in reach and had the draft language
removed and replaced by a ministerial decision. 69 The Decision on Anticircum-
vention both recognizes the problem of circumvention, the inability to reach
consensus in the Round, the desirability of having uniform rules as soon as
possible, and refers the issue to the Antidumping Committee for resolution.
64. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61 Stat. All, 55
U.N.T.S. 188.
65. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 18.1.
66. See id. art. 2.2.1.1.
67. As one of the Senate conferees pointed out in 1988 when the major input rule was added
to the statute, "Itlhe conferees intended this to permit Commerce to use either the producer's own
cost of production or an arm's length price .... With these guarantees, the conferees believe that
the amendment is fair and does not violate the GATT rules." 134 CONG. REC. S 4912 (1988) (statement
of Sen. Danforth) (emphasis added).
68. EEC-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, Report by the Panel, GATT Doc.
L/6657 (March 22, 1990).
69. See generally NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 11, at 1616-40; Terence P. Stewart, The
Development of U.S. Anticircumvention Law, 1994 INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE (June 23-24,
1994).
VOL. 29, NO. 2
ANTIDUMPING LAW 501
As reviewed on pages 222 and 223 of the SAA, the changes made in U.S.
law will help address circumvention problems that the 1988 legislation rendered
unreachable. While a useful step, the amendments do not address a wide range
of problems identified during the Uruguay Round negotiations and in the 1992
debates over possible legislative change. While the proposed legislation recog-
nizes that third-country parts can constitute significant problems in administra-
tion, the third-country parts are not in fact covered in the circumvention probe.
This lacuna will minimize the utility of the provision in many consumer electronic
and office equipment cases. Similarly, the administration does not address the
problems posed by "country hopping"-a problem that plagues many orders
and that was a focus of detailed consideration during the Uruguay Round. Thus,
U.S. law, while moving a step forward through the changes made, will continue
to create the illusion of effective enforcement for many industries. Petitioners
will have to hope that the administration will obtain cover for these other issues
in the Code Committee process in Geneva.
Diversionary input dumping is just a clarification of existing statutory authority
for determining the value of an input in the manufacturing cost where it is a
major input and from a related party.70
F. COST RECOVERY
Mr. Holmer:
The U.S. antidumping law provides that home-market (or third-country) sales
below the cost of production will not be used as the basis for determining normal
value if, among other criteria, costs are not recovered within a reasonable time.
Section 224 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (in accordance with House
proposals) adds a new section 773(b)(2)(D) of the Act, providing that recovery
of costs is shown if actual weighted-average prices exceed weighted-average
costs during the period of investigation or review.71
Furthermore, the SAA directs Commerce to consider variations in unit costs
caused by periodic temporary disruptions to production that occur on a less
frequent than annual basis, and in such instances not to require full recovery of
costs during the period of investigation or review. Additionally, Commerce is
directed to consider other methods of demonstrating recovery of costs, if appro-
priate.72
Mr. Stewart:
The proposed changes to U.S. law on sales below cost are generally designed
to conform exactly to the articulation of the test contained in the Antidumping
70. See SAA, supra note 7, at 224-25; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d)(3).
71. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(2)(D).
72. SAA, supra note 7, at 832.
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Agreement. For example, article 2.2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement includes
both the general test [compare section 773a(b)(1)], a definition of when recovery
of costs will be found [compare section 773a(b)(2)(D)], a definition of extended
period of time [compare section 773a(b)(2)(B)], and a definition of substantial
quantities [compare section 773a(b)(2)(C)].73 Thus, the cost recovery provisions
should present very little controversy as they mirror the GATT requirements.
The permutations provided for when the ITA will take special account of
unusual cost situations (for example, periodic temporary disruptions) are noncon-
troversial at least in principle. As respondents must claim the special treatment,
the real concern will be whether Commerce will permit a claim to be made in
a review where it has not been raised in earlier proceedings. Stated differently,
petitioners would be concerned if respondents could claim the adjustment in the
periods when the additional costs occur when the respondent has not identified
the additional costs as applicable in earlier periods when the costs were not
incurred.
Mr. Horlick:
The Antidumping Agreement provides that below-cost sales may be disre-
garded in the calculation of normal value only if such sales are at prices that do
not permit cost recovery within a reasonable period of time. 74 The Agreement
contains no limitation of the possible length of the "reasonable period of time"
for cost recovery. However, the Agreement does establish a "safe harbor,"
whereby prices that are below cost at the time of sale but above weighted-average
cost for the period of investigation will automatically be considered to provide
for the recovery of costs within a reasonable period of time.75
During discussions on the formulation of the implementing legislation and in
its proposed legislation, the administration proposed statutory language to limit
the "reasonable period of time" for cost recovery to the period of investigation
or review. However, the provision in the Agreement does not contain such limita-
tion.7 6 If the Agreement intended such limitation of cost recovery to the period
of investigation or review, there would be no need for the "reasonable period
of time" language in article 2.2.1.
73. See generally id. at 831-34.
74. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.2.1.
75. See id.
76. It is interesting to note that two U.S. steel companies, USX and Bethlehem, have argued
against such limitations on the cost recovery period when charged with dumping in Canada. See
Complainants' Reply Brief at 18, 54-56, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High Strength
Low Alloy Plate, Heat-Treated or Not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America,
58 Fed. Reg. 34,420 (request for panel review) (CDA-93-1904-04) (in view of the "cyclical nature
of pricing in that industry, such that periods of sales at a loss would not be uncommon"). Complainants'
Brief at 29, 95, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate,
Heat-Treated or Not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, id. (request
for panel review) (CDA-93-1904-04).
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II. Provisions Proposed but Rejected
A. No OR SHORT SUPPLY
Mr. Holmer:
Efforts were made in both the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means
Committees to provide for the suspension of antidumping duties in cases where a
specific product subject to such duties is not available from any domestic producer.
While the amendments were defeated in the respective committees, the issue is
likely to resurface in future trade bills.
Mr. Horlick:
The Antidumping Agreement explicitly provides for, and indeed encourages,
the permissive application of antidumping duties.77 In essence, the Agreement
permits each country to make its own determination as to whether the imposition
of antidumping duties is in its best interest. One of the flaws in the U.S. system
has been the inflexibility to deal in a common-sense way with situations where
domestic supply is nonexistent or insufficient to satisfy demand for merchandise
subject to antidumping duties. Other countries, such as the European Union and
Canada, are able to deal with such situations either through a public interest test
or a lesser duty rule (where dumping duties may be imposed in an amount lower
than the actual level of dumping found). The United States has rejected such
concepts.
When domestic producers are unable to supply a needed product, the application
of dumping duties to imports of that product only serves to punish U.S. industrial
users, without providing any counterbalancing benefit to domestic producers. In
this situation, there are only two true beneficiaries of the dumping duties: foreign
suppliers, who can raise their prices in the U.S. market and earn windfall profits
at the expense of U.S. industrial users; and the downstream foreign competitors
of the U.S. industrial users, who gladly find their American counterparts ham-
strung by higher costs. The higher costs from antidumping duties have a serious
adverse impact on the ability of U.S. industrial users to compete in world markets
and may ultimately translate into a loss of U.S. jobs. This disadvantage has
occurred in a number of cases-notably, Flat Panel Displays and Ball Bearings,7 8
where U.S. companies were forced to move operations offshore because of the
lack of domestic supply of necessary components at any price. (For example,
lead times of forty-eight weeks were quoted for domestically produced ball bear-
77. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9.1.
78. See Certain High Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass Therefor from
Japan, USITC Pub. 2413, Inv. No.731-TA-469 (Final) (August 1991); Antifriction Bearings (Other
Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2185,
Inv. Nos. 303-TA-19 and 20 and 731-TA-391-399 (Final) (May 1989).
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ings.) The common-sense solution to short-supply situations is to give the Com-
merce Department the authority to grant time- and quantity-limited waivers from
the payment of antidumping duties. As soon as a domestic producer is able to
supply the product, the short-supply waiver would be terminated.
Although the inclusion of a short-supply proposal in the implementing bill was
ultimately rejected, the provision received considerable support in the House.
In the end, however, the administration won over the crucial votes in the Senate
Finance Committee to defeat the measure, after convincing those senators that
the administration already has the authority under the current law to accomplish
the goals sought through the enactment of a short-supply provision.79
Mr. Stewart:
Proposals for a no-supply or short-supply exception to coverage from an anti-
dumping or countervailing duty order represented a solution to a nonexistent
problem. The nature of relief provided by an antidumping duty order is the
assessment of a duty to offset any price discrimination found. Stated differently,
the remedy does not limit supply in any way. Hence, there can never be a short-
79. During the course of the legislative debate, the Commerce Department claimed in a communi-
cation sent to Senator Boren that it has the authority under current law to assist U.S. industry faced
with short-supply situations. Specifically, Commerce stated:
There are mechanisms under current law by which a product can be excluded from
an order without undermining the overall effectiveness of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws.
Throughout the investigation, the administering authority has the ability to define
and clarify the scope of the case to exclude products where coverage would not serve
the purposes for which the petition was brought. In addition, in making the injury
determination, the ITC must define "like product" based on consideration of whether
the characteristics and uses of the domestic production are similar to those of the
imported product. The fact that a product is not made in the United States will be
reflected in the ITC's determination of whether the imports are a cause of injury to
the domestic industry. If petitioning companies are not producing a competing product,
there will be no lost sales, or adverse price impact with respect to the particular
merchandise and this will be a factor taken into account in making the overall injury
determination.
After an order is in effect, the administering authority can clarify the scope of an
order. If a product has substantially different characteristics or uses than the merchan-
dise covered by the order and it is unclear whether the order included the specific
product at issue, it can be declared outside the scope the order. Furthermore, the
Department will continue to have the authority, based on a changed circumstances
review, to revoke an order in part when maintaining an order as issued is no longer
of interest to the domestic producers. Finally, an order will not continue indefinitely
if it is not continuing to provide a needed remedy to the domestic industry. Under
the new sunset review procedures required by the GATT, if injury is not likely to
continue or recur, the order will be revoked. The goal of defining the scope and
duration of orders through these procedures is to ensure that the petitioning industries
are provided an adequate remedy while not unnecessarily inhibiting trade.
Facsimile from the Office of Import Administration to Sen. Boren (Aug. 8, 1994).
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supply or no-supply situation caused by the existence of a dumping order or the
payment of a dumping duty. Rather the remedy seeks the elimination of price
discrimination. The law is intended to change the pricing practices of foreign
producers. Congress has been long concerned that the unfair trade laws operate
in a manner to provide effective relief from injurious price discrimination. The
proposal for a no-supply or a short-supply provision would seriously erode the
effectiveness of the relief provided.
Proponents of the no-supply or short-supply provision were unsuccessful in
getting the issue included in the Uruguay Round agreement. Issues raised were
rejected by most observers.
For example, the claim that purchasers in the United States are disadvantaged
by having to pay fair value is counterintuitive. The antidumping law is an anti-
price-discrimination statute. Elimination of price discrimination results in import-
ers paying a price comparable to that paid abroad. This result is true today and
has been true since the law took effect in 1921. While importers in such situations
may lose a false advantage, the law has always intended that result.
Similarly, claims that the injured domestic industry should not be concerned
when it is unable to supply all or any of a particular item ignore the commercial
reality of why companies stop producing or never start producing a particular
item-expected inadequate return on investment. Without the correction of the
price discrimination, domestic producers will not be able to make market-driven
decisions about expanding production, reentering products where prior dumped
pricing signals dictated market exit. There is no realistic way to provide the
market signals where products are exempted from payment of duty. Such a system
also would have the perverse effect of rewarding the most successful dumpers-
those that have eliminated all domestic production of an item or prevented U.S.
companies from ever commencing production.
Finally, people who pursue short supply are acting against their long-term
interest. In most situations, the imposition of duties provides the market signals
to permit domestic and foreign companies to make rational decisions about pro-
duction, which generally means more buying options will exist within a few years
than existed at the time of the case.
Consider the antifriction bearing orders from 1989. At the time of the case, the
industry had closed some thirty plants, or more than $1 billion in investment, and
lost more than 13,000 workers. A number of users of bearings appeared at the hear-
ing and testified about an inability to obtain the product from the petitioner. In the
last five years, close to $1 billion has been reinvested in the United States by various
companies. A substantial part of the investment would not have occurred had there
been a no-supply provision. Domestic companies had stopped producing particular
items because it was unprofitable to continue production at dumped prices. When
prices were restored, investments again appeared profitable. Much of the invest-
ment was put into the very items identified as allegedly not produced in sufficient
quantity in the United States. Had a short-supply or no-supply provision been opera-
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tional, little if any of the investment would have occurred as there would have been
no market signal to indicate likely profitability of reinvesting.
B. DUTY AS A COST
Mr. Holmer:
Certain U.S. petitioners argued that Commerce should be required to treat the
amount of an antidumping duty as a cost of doing business in the United States.
Petitioners proposed to deduct this amount from the U.S. price in certain cases
where an importer is related to the exporter and does not raise its price in the
United States to reflect fully the payment of the duty (that is, where the exporter
absorbs the duty).
Mr. Stewart:
One of the most important issues authorized by the Uruguay Round Antidumping
Agreement and not dealt with by U.S. implementing legislation is the provision
for a remedy to duty absorption. U.S. law and practice have historically prevented
foreign producers from absorbing antidumping duties in purchase price situations
involving unrelated parties. 80 In related party importer situations, Commerce de-
fines reimbursement out of existence on the grounds that the transfer of funds be-
tween related parties should not be viewed as reimbursement. 81 Since the vast ma-
jority of cases involve related party importers, Commerce has effectively created
a bias in administration in favor of related party importers. Such a result is unwar-
ranted. The Uruguay Round Final Act provides authority to prevent such absorp-
tion in related party transactions. 82 The text also confirms the rights of importing
countries to prevent price manipulation of multiple products by related party im-
porters and their customers to create fictitious prices for antidumping review pur-
poses. Congress should amend U.S. law to conform with the GATT right contained
in the Uruguay Round text and to require certification by the importer (subject to
potential verification) that no price manipulation has occurred.
Where a product subject to an antidumping duty order is imported by an unre-
lated importer, domestic producers generally receive price relief in the market
(absent reimbursement). The unrelated importer must pay the antidumping duty
owed. Even if the importer chooses to absorb the dumping duties, the importer's
costs have been significantly increased, and the importer can be a bona fide
prospect for domestic producers who will compete against the higher total costs
for imports. By contrast, if the importer is related, to the extent that dumping
continues and dumping duties are paid by the importer, relief is artificially cur-
tailed. This result is due to the twin facts that the prices to the importer's customers
80. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 353.26.
81. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,729, 39,736 (July 26, 1993).
82. See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 2.4, 9.3.3.
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have not been raised (or not raised sufficiently) and the importer is not a potential
customer for the domestic producers.
Stated differently, where dumping continues, relief occurs where the importer
is unrelated; relief is reduced or eliminated where the importer is related. Such
a result is irrational and not required by the antidumping agreement (new or old).
Once an order is issued, every petitioner is entitled to compete against fair value
in the market. In related party importer situations, the petitioner is routinely
denied that right.
The antidumping law is not intended as a revenue raiser for the government
but as a remedial provision to "level the playing field." Yet the current adminis-
tration, and the failure to adopt a provision permitting duty absorbed by related
party importers to be treated as a cost, assures that the field will not be level
and that the remedy will be at least partially denied in most cases.
In many cases, purchasers in the United States insist that foreign producers
set up U.S. subsidiaries to absorb the antidumping duties so that the issuance of
an antidumping duty order will have no actual effect on prices paid by purchasers.
This cannot be right.
Predictably, those opposing the provision have raised a series of red herrings-
whether treating duty as a cost under the U.S. retrospective duty assessment
system would be consistent with article 2.4;8" whether such a provision could
be applied predictably and fairly; and whether an absorption problem even
exists. Each of the concerns listed are easily answered.
83. Article 2.4 of the new Antidumping Agreement is identical to the relevant language with
article 2.6 of the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. Article 2.4 does not distinguish between situations
where duties are collected "prospectively" (E.U. and Canadian systems) or "retrospectively" (U.S.
system). Rather it identifies adjustments that should be made for differences in circumstance of sale
and has special language for related party importations. Where a related party importer is involved,
"allowances for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for
profits accruing, should also be made." Antidumping Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.4. This language
is the same as the 1979 Code. Indeed, article 9.3.3, which talks about when antidumping duties
cannot be deducted from the export price in a related party importer situation, is not limited to
either prospective or retrospective situations (just as articles 2.3 and 2.4 are not) even though other
subparagraphs in 9.3 specifically reference either prospective or retrospective situations. See id. art.
9.3.1 ("When the amount of the antidumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis"); id. art.
9.3.2 ("When the amount of the antidumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis").
84. The fact that the amount of antidumping duties owed is not certain at the time of importation
or sale is irrelevant to whether an adjustment should be made. Commerce routinely grants downward
adjustments to dumping margins to foreign producers for post-sale rebates where the system of
rebates is known for part of the contract even though the amount cannot be determined until much
later. See, e.g., Certain Internal-Combustion, Industrial Forklift Trucks from Japan, 53 Fed. Reg.
12,553, 12,561 (Dep't Comm. 1988) (final LTFV deter.) ("Rebates do not have to be paid during
the period of investigation, but they must be tied to sales made during that period"). Similarly,
warranty expenses are not known at the time of sale, but are routinely adjusted for in dumping
calculations. Color Picture Tubes from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,171 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (final
LTFV deter.) (grant of warranty expense claim for Mitsubishi based on five-year historical warranty
data, even absent written warranty agreement). Moreover, in many cases, reviews are not requested
for many companies so that duties assessed are the duties deposited (reducing or eliminating any
"uncertainty").
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Applying the principle "fairly" is a nonsequitur. What is wrong with current
practice is the failure of Commerce to treat the absorption of duties as a cost.
This failure contributes to the lack of fair price competition in the marketplace.
Related party importers could handle the problem by either raising prices suffi-
ciently to eliminate the dumping or, if they seek to skate close to the edge, by
including a clause in their contracts indicating that any duties found owed will
be separately billed to the purchaser. It is the refusal by the exporter or related
party importer to do either of the above that results in duties being absorbed.
The proposed change to treat duty absorption as a cost would be fair by definition.
Finally, claims that absorption is not a problem are contradicted by the Federal
Register notices in the administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders and
by the experience of many domestic industries that have seen foreign producers
selling through related parties not change their pricing in the U.S. market despite
the existence of substantial margins. Duty absorption is a real and significant
problem. Unfortunately, the issue is addressed at present solely as a factor in
sunset reviews. 85 Until U.S. law is changed to take advantage of our GATT rights
to neutralize duty absorption, the remedy will always be partial where related
party importers are involved.
Mr. Horlick:
In 1986 the European Community began to treat antidumping duties as a cost
and, as such, deducted the duties from the export price. One of the European
Community's primary negotiating objectives in the Round was to include specific
language in the Agreement to condone this practice.
In the past, the U.S. government had formally objected to the European Com-
munity's treatment of dumping duties as a cost.86 However, the dynamic of the
Uruguay Round antidumping negotiations was such that, very early on, the United
States and the European Community entered into a "nonaggression pact" to
support each other on antidumping.
As soon as the European Community succeeded in getting an explicit provision
in the Agreement permitting the treatment of dumping duties as a cost, petitioning
Similarly, there is nothing about Commerce practice that suggests administrative changes are any
more frequent or important than at other agencies. Moreover, construction of laws is generally
applied to the factual situation before the agency or court even though the construction may not have
been known at the time of the activity or may be changed upon review. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2d
Administrative Law § 81-83 and cases cited therein. Hence the concern that the law is not predictable
does not appear either fact-based or due to a desire to provide special treatment to related party
importers not warranted by general principles of administrative law.
85. See SAA, supra note 7, at 215.
86. See Letter from Alan F. Holmer, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
to Hans Beseler, Director, Trade Policy Instruments, Commission of the European Communities(Mar. 31, 1986) (objecting to the E.C. 's treatment of duties as a cost on the grounds that it perpetuates
the imposition of dumping duties after the dumping has ceased, it undermines the remedial purposes
of the antidumping law, and it violates the Code if the result is the imposition of a duty in excess
of the margin of dumping). See also CBO Study, supra note 35, at 37.
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industries in the United States jumped on the bandwagon and began lobbying
for the inclusion of a duty as a cost provision in U.S. law. The administration
succeeded in fighting off such efforts, and the fast-track package explicitly rejects
duty as a cost.87 In its stead is a limited provision on "duty absorption" under
which Commerce will examine, if requested, during the second and fourth admin-
istrative reviews whether a foreign producer or exporter selling through an affili-
ated importer in the United States is absorbing the dumping duties rather than
eliminating the dumping.88 An affirmative finding of duty absorption will not
affect the calculation of the dumping margins.89 Rather, Commerce will make
either an affirmative or negative duty absorption finding and notify the ITC of
its finding. The ITC, in turn, will take into account Commerce's duty absorption
finding for purposes of its analysis on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence
of injury in the sunset review. 90
C. COMPENSATION
Mr. Holmer:
Some U.S. industries proposed that a portion of the duties collected in an
antidumping case should be given to members of the domestic industry to be
earmarked for investment or worker-related benefits. However, despite consider-
able early activity, neither the House Ways and Means nor Senate Finance com-
mittee drafts of the implementing bill included this provision.
Mr. Stewart:
Congress as well as the current and prior administrations have repeatedly
promised domestic producers a "level playing field" through the neutralization
of dumping. Unfortunately, the law as administered delivers relief only after an
industry is behind and permits duty absorption to go uncorrected, which denies
most domestic producers even one opportunity to face fair pricing and provides
no redress for past or ongoing harm. With the addition of sunset reviews, foreign
producers now will have an incentive to continue to buy marketshare as there
will be some probability of orders going away after five years. Congress has
missed a major opportunity to rebalance the law to safeguard that relief provided
is effective and that promises of a level playing field are, in fact, delivered.
The proposal during the Uruguay Round implementing bill to have dumping
duties actually collected paid to the petitioner and those in support of the petition
would have gone part of the way to making U.S. law more effective. It is critical
87. See SAA, supra note 7, at 885.
88. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, supra note 2, § 220.
89. See SAA, supra note 7, at 885.
90. See the Act, supra note 2, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(d), as amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, supra note 2, § 221(a).
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that U.S. trade laws be effective and provide an incentive to foreign producers
to charge and for importers to pay fair value. The provision of compensation,
in the form of duties actually assessed, is viewed as one of the incentives appro-
priate to render the laws more effective.
This provision would not attempt to compensate injured industries for past
harm, but merely provides that where dumping continues, duties collected will
be distributed to those who petitioned or who supported the petition. Such distribu-
tion will allow those parties who have been promised a level playing field to
reinvest in plant, equipment, and personnel without fear that continued dumping
will render such investments economically unsound. Most importantly, the provi-
sion should encourage foreign producers to sell at fair values as continued dump-
ing will result in duties being transferred to domestic competitors-reducing the
economic incentive to continue dumping.
Arguments against compensation are either against interest (that is, compensa-
tion should improve the competitiveness of suppliers; purchasers who oppose
compensation are acting against their long-term interest of having strong suppli-
ers) or without merit. A few examples of concerns raised are explored below.
Some have argued that compensation is prohibited by the GATT. There is no
prohibition in the GATT against the distribution of duties collected. 9 Some have
opined that other countries might impose countervailing duties on products that
receive compensation. While possible if one assumes that the distribution of
duties collected would be viewed as a subsidy, it is unrealistic to assume that
countervailing duties would be assessed in most situations 92 and that the United
States could not provide the option for domestic producers concerned with such
an outcome not to receive the funds.
Nor is compensation a form of private right of action. A private right of action
places a foreign producer or importer at additional risk of liability where harm
to a domestic producer is found. Compensation, by contrast, does not increase
liability; it merely directs the distribution of funds collected because of continued
dumping. Concerns about administrability, mirror legislation, or encouragement
of frivolous suits are similarly without merit.
Mr. Horlick:
At the urging of certain domestic industries, including the integrated steel
mills, legislation was proposed that would have granted compensation to domestic
91. In 1988 when Congress considered private rights of action, Professor John Jackson indicated
in a letter to Chairman Rostenkowski that compensation (payment of duties collected to domestic
industry) did not raise GATT concerns whereas private rights of action could raise GATT problems.
92. The GATT agreement recognizes that subsidies are provided for many legitimate reasons
and are actionable only under certain circumstances. Even assuming that compensation would be
viewed as a subsidy, it is not clear that the subsidy would be actionable, that domestic producers
receiving compensation would be major exporters, or that exporters would be found to be causing
material injury because of the "subsidies."
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industries payable from antidumping duties collected. 93 After some debate on
the issue, the administration eventually came out opposed to compensation, in
part because it would reduce U.S. revenues by several billion dollars over five
years, thus creating additional funding problems that the administration would
have to make up elsewhere. 94
The problems with the compensation proposal were far greater than the loss
of revenue. The first and perhaps the most persuasive argument against compensa-
tion is that it could easily be seen as a potentially countervailable domestic subsidy.
The administration would have been hard-pressed to justify the payment of subsid-
ies to domestic industries, even if nominally usable only for pension plans, particu-
larly to those industries such as steel that have long argued that all money is
fungible, and that subsidies to larger groups than the likely recipients of compensa-
tion are specific.
Some argued that a compensation provision would likely be found to violate
article 18.1 of the Agreement, which provides that antidumping duties or under-
takings are the exclusive remedy for dumping. Many large U.S. companies op-
posed the idea of compensation, in principle, on the theory that it would create
a private right of action and that it would encourage the filing of petitions for
the wrong reasons. Finally, compensation posed a real problem of perception
for Congress. Even if some constituents supported the concept of compensation,
the image of voting in support of the payment of big law firms' legal fees was
undesirable.
III. Conclusion
While other arguments may be made about the various antidumping provisions
enacted or considered but rejected, this article illustrates the vigor of the debate
that has absorbed the international trade law community for the last several years.
In light of the high stakes on all sides of these issues, the debate is likely to
continue, particularly if the congressional session convened in January 1995
considers more trade legislation, centered upon a renewal of fast-track negotiating
authority.
93. See H.R. 4206, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1994).
94. See Letter from Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
to Robert T. Matsui, Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways and Means Committee (June
30, 1994), reprinted in 12 INSIDE U.S. TRADE S-4 (July 15, 1994).
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